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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Elevon Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonneii Douglas Astronautfcs Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction Was given 5y the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986. The IOA
_roac_ features a E6p- o_n_l_is of the--_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Elevon system
hardware.
The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing
surface as shown in Figure i. The proper function of the elevons
is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and
entry. During flight, the Orbiter is controlled, in part, by four
aerosurfaces called elevons. An elevon is a control surface which
performs the same functions as an elevator and an aileron on a
conventional airplane. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons
are used for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons
are used to pitch and roll the vehicle.
! i
Specifically, the elevon system hardware comprises the following
components:
o Flow Cutoff Valve
o Switching Valve
o Electro-Hydraulic (EH) Servoactuator
o Secondary Delta Pressure Transducer
o Bypass Valve
o Power Valve
o Power Valve Check Valve
o Primary Actuator
o Primary Delta Pressure Transducer
o Primary Actuator Position Transducer
uThe IOA analysis process utilized available elevon hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figure i presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the elevon system hardware components. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/i I 2_IR 12/2Number : 8 3/IR13 3/2RI- 3/35
TOTAL
25
m
m
D
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
m
I
4 +
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/iNumber : 8 2/1R92/2 I 3_IRI- 3/2RI_ TOTAL18
Of the 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be PCIs.
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Figure 1 - ELEVON ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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I2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The I0A analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components _
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions _ _
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define maJor as_semb!ies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document I0A analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Elevon Ground Rules and Assumptions
The elevon ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION I
The following sections describe the elevon actuator system
hardware. Each of the four elevon actuator systems (Figure 2)
comprise the following components: a flow cutoff valve, switching
valve, EH servoactuator, secondary pressure transducer, bypass
valve, power valve, primary actuator, primary actuator delta
pressure transducer, and primary actuator position transducer.
3.1 Elevon Design and Function
The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing
surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during
the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During flight the
Orbiter is controlled, in part, by four aerosurfaces called
elevons. An elevon is a control surface which performs the same
functions as an elevator and an aileron on a conventional
airplane. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used
for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons are used
to pitch and roll the vehicle.
Each elevon actuator is driven by one primary actuator. Control
of the actuator is provided by four EH servovalves. These
servovalves are used to create a secondary delta pressure which
controls the flow of hydraulic fluid to one power valve. This
power valve, when actuated, diverts fluid to the primary actuator
(Figure 3).
The flow cutoff valve (or low-pressure bypass valve) is used to
circulate hydraulic fluid during certain thermally cold periods.
The flow cutoff valve should be opened during circulation pump
operations only. The flow cutoff valve must be closed during
high-pressure operations or degraded elevon performance will
result.
The switching valve diverts pressure from one of the Orbiter's
three hydraulic systems to supply adequate fluid and pressure to
the primary and secondary elevon hydraulic system. The switching
valve (Figure 4) contains two pistons, a primary and a secondary.
If the pressure in the primary Orbiter hydraulic system drops
below 1200 to 1500 psi, the switching valve primary piston will
translate and allow the secondary hydraulic system to provide the
required fluid and pressure to the downstream actuators. If the
second hydraulic system is unable to provide pressure above 1200
to 1500 psi, the second switching valve piston will translate
allowing the third hydraullcsystem to provide pressure to the
actuator and servovalves. Linear Variable Differential
Transformers (LVDTs) attached to the switching valve pistons
indicate to the crew which hydraulic system is powering the
elevon.
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Figure 2 - ELEVON SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 --TYPI_L ELEVON ACTUATi0N SYSTEM
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Figure 4 - sWITCHING VALVE
The many small passages, orifices, and restrictions in the
secondary side of the servovalve assembly are highly sensitive to
contaminants which enter the hydraulic system. A 15 micron
filter conditions the hydraulic fluid which supplies the
secondary side of the actuation system.
The elevon bypass valve is used to isolate an erroneous
servovalve output from influencing the power valve movement. If
secondary delta pressure exceeds 2200 psi for 120 milliseconds,
the bypass valve diverts fluid away from the power spool to the
return, preventing the erroneous or failed channel from creating
a potential force-figh£ or incorrectly influencing power spool
and elevon motion.
The secondary delta pressure transducers are used to measure the
instantaneous pressure differential between the hydraulic source
(nominally 3000 psi) and the servovalve reduced pressure. The
transducer comprises a dual-spring balanced piston and a LVDT
which transmits a transducer piston position in the form of a
voltage to the Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA). The ASA can use
this voltage to determine the delta pressure across the
corresponding servovalve. This information is used to bias
equalization of four servovalve channels and activate their
corresponding bypass valves when a channel cutoff is required.
The power valve combines four servovalve induced secondary delta
pressures into a translation representing the commanded elevon
movement. As the power valve moves, it allows a primary pressure
to translate the primary actuator and its corresponding elevon.
When one of the four secondary pressures are bypassed or
erroneous, the remaining three pressures will overdrive the power
valve.
The primary actuator is responsible for the ultimate motion of
the elevon. It is controlled by a secondary pressure power valve
which diverts primary hydraulic fluid and pressure to the
actuator (Figure 5).
The primary delta pressure transducer is used to measure the
instantaneous pressure differential across the primary actuator.
The transducer comprises a dual-spring balanced piston and a LVDT
which transmits a transducer piston position in the form of a
voltage to the ASA. The ASA uses this voltage to determine the
delta pressure across the primary actuator.
The position feedback transducer feeds the instantaneous position
of the elevon to the ASA and General Purpose Computers (GPCs).
The transducer consists of a LVDT calibrated to feedback a
position voltage to the ASA. This information is used by th ASA
for servovalve biasing and to the GPCs for Flight Control System
(FCS) and caution and warning inputs. The current elevon position
is displayed to the crew on the surface position indicators on
Panel F7.
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Figure 5 - ELEVON ACTUATOR
ll
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The elevon system hardware is located at the trailing edge of the
Orbiter's wings. The elevon system interfaces with the Orbiter's
three hydraulic systems, each corresponding to one Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU). The elevon system hardware interfaces with the
ASAs which in turn interface with the FCS port_on of the GPCs for
system control, fault detection, actuation and feedback.
l
I
I
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the elevon hardware and
corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 5 comprise the
detailed system representations.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESU£TS
The _elevon system schematic is depicted in Figure 2. The
functional representation of the major system components is shown
in Figures 3 and 4.
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities. Note that the tables below are
divided into two groups: one for the primary actuator and
related components and one for the secondary actuator and
associated control items. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
4.1 Primary Actuator Analysis
This section describes failure modes analyzed in the primary
actuator, primary actuator heaters, primary actuator delta
pressure transducer and primary actuator position transducer.
The failures analyzed for these components includes: internal
and external leakage, structural failure, loss of or erroneous
output, and heaters failing on or off.
4.2 Secondary Actuator Control Analysis
This section describes failure modes analyzed in the flow cutoff
valve, switching valve, secondary system filter, EH servo valve,
secondary delta pressure transducer, bypass valve, power valve
and the power valve check valve. The failures analyzed for these
components includes: internal leakage, seal failure, restricted
flow, component rupture, Jammed piston or valves, failure to
switch, loss of output, and units failing open or closed.
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gTABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
o Primary
Actuator
Primary
Actuator
Primary
DP Transducer
Prim. Act.
Position
Transducer
o Secondary
Actuator
Flow Cutoff
Valve
Switching VLV
EH Servo VLV
Secondary DP
Transducer
Bypass VLV
Power VLV
Power VLV
Check VLV
TOTAL
i/i
2
1
m
1
1
w
2
2/IR
1
2
E
1
9
3/IR 3/2R 3/3
2
2/2
3
2
m
1
5
TOTAL
2
3
5
1
2
2
2
25
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Of these 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be
PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix
D contains a cross-reference between each PCI and a specific
analysis worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
o Primary
Actuator
Primary
Actuator
Prim. Act.
DP Transducer
Prim. Act.
Position
Transducer
o Secondary
Actuator
Flow Cutoff
Valve
Switching VLV
EH Servo VLV
Secondary DP
Transducer
Bypass VLV
Power VLV
Power VLV
Check VLV
TOTAL
i/i
2
1
1
1
1
8
2/IR
2
3
1
2
i
.
3/2R2/2 3/IR
i m
i
i
-- i
m
1
TOTAL
i
3
4
1
2
2
2
18
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5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
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i. NSTS 22206:
2. FCS/EFF 2102:
3. JSCII174:
4. VS70-580996:
5. STS82-0039A:
6. NASA CP-2342:
7. SD72-SH-0102-9:
Instructions for Preparation of
FMEA and CIL October I0, 1986.
The FCS/Effectors Training Manual
February 1982
MOD Drawings - applicable pages
Rockwell Drawings
Applicable CIL Sections
Space Shuttle Technical Conference
Part 2, pp. 861-871, June 28-30,
1983.
Requirements/Definition Document
Aero Flight Control Mechanisms
Rockwell International, Volume 2-9,
October 28, 1975
The following references have been ordered, but were unavailable
for the independentassessment:
I. SD72-SH-0102-6: Requirements/Definition Document
Hydraulic Subsystem
Rockwell International
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
APU
ASA
ASSY
CIL
EH
FCS
FM
FMEA
F
GFE
GPC
HW
IOA
LVDT
MDAC
NA
NASA
NSTS
PCI
psi
psid
RI
VLV
xducer
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Assembly
- Critical Items List
- Electro-Hydraullc
- Flight Control System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Functional
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Linear Variable Differential Transformer
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Potential Critical Item
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Rockwell International
- Valve
- Transducer
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 19_[ were used with the _r6_lowing
_plifications and addit oI_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-60PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-fllght
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
%-_nsition to OPS 9, post-fllght
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
pa-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest critical_ty
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0PS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
=
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _r-_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I00--_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp-[ifica_iohs and addition-s.
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of @nalysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during A0S by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Elevon-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
None.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206± Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, I0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at-the
b--_to--m--6f--6ach sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOAANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of llfe/vehicle
3 l All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) _aiiof which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, couid cause loss of mission,
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 101
ITEM: FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILS OPEN DURING HIGH PRESSURE OPERATION-SLIGHT LOSS OF SYSTEM
PRESSURE; NOMINALLY OPEN AT LOW PRESSURE OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
l
I
[]
I
m
I
I
m
B
I
g
m
D
I
[]
g
C-2
wm
m
w
F
_J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o2/86
ELEVON
102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
=
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILS DURING LOW PRESSURE OPERATION; HEATERS CONDITION THE
SYSTEM-NO OPERATIONAL AFFECT. NOMINALLY CLOSED AT HIGH PRESSURE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
m
E
r_
C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: SWITCHING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: SEAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEAL IN SWITCHING VALVE FAILS; LOSS OF FLUID IN ONE HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. SYSTEM OPERATES NORMALLY ON SECONDARY SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELEVON FLIGHT:
104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCHING VALVE
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: BROKEN OR FAILED SPRING; CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPRING FAILS TO MAINTAIN RESTORING FORCE, PRIMARY SWITCHING VALVE
CANNOT MAINTAIN POSITION FORPRIMARY PRESSURE. SECONDARY SIDE OF
SWITCHING VALVE CONTROLS PRESSURE TO ELEVON SYSTEM. SYSTEM
OPERATES NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
_=_
F
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: SWITCHING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: COMPONENT RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EF_CTSI_TIONALE:--..-. .... _ ..... _.....
COMPONENT HOUSING FAILS DOWNSTREAM OF SWITCHING VALVE. LOSS OF
HYDRAULIC FLUID AND ELEVON MOTION/CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ....
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86
ELEVON
106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) CHECK VALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL" i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/i
DE ORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRIMARY ACTUATOR STARVED OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND PRESSURE. LOSS
OF ELEVON MOVEMENT AND CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
.==
=-.__
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
SWITCHING VALVE
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: , _ ....
PRIMARY ACTUATOR ENCOUNTERS AHIGH HINGE MOMENTBACK_PRESSURING _
THE UPSTREAM SYSTEM. THE SWITCHING VALUE CANNOT OPERATE IF A
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IS LOST DURING THIS PERIOD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE AND VEHICLE.
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELEVON FLIGHT:
108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER - 15 MICRON
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTAMINATED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
SECONDARY SIDE OF SYSTEM DEPRIVED OF FLUID AND PRESSURE; LOSS OF
PRIMARY ACTUATOR CONTROL/MOTION.
REFERENCES:
C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: SERVO VALVE
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED PISTON; FLAPPER VALVE FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN SYSTEM, LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE OF FOUR SERVO VALVES BIND; REMAINING THREE SERVO VALVES
OVERDRIVE THE JAMMED SYSTEM. PRIMARY ACTUATOR FUNCTIONS
NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/01/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: ll0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SERVO VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER- 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: DAMAGED SEALS-FOREIGN MATERIALS IN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARRIER SEALS PREVENT LEAKAGE OF FLUID EXTERNAL TO COMPONENTS;
SYSTEM OPERATES NORMALLY.
REFERENCES:
i==
C-II
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: iii
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM: SERVO VALVE RESTRICTOR
FAILURE MODE: PLUGGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELEVON
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
SWITCHING VALVE
FILTER - 15 MICRON
SERVO VALVE
SERVO VALVE RESTRICTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO DELTA PRESSURE ACROSS SERVO VALVE; LOSS OF ONE SERVO VALVE,
THREE REMAINING VALVES OPERATE ELEVON NOMINALLY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELEVON FLIGHT:
112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL, BROKEN SPRING, LOSS OF ASA SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THREE REMAINING SERVO VALVES OVERDRIVE THESYSTEM IF BYPASS VALVE
DOES NOT OPEN WHEN SECONDARY DELTA PRESSURE >2200 PSID. SYSTEM
FUNCTIONS NOMINALLY. _......
REFERENCES:
w
\
C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/24/86
ELEVON
113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BYPASS VALVE FILTER-100 MICRON
PLUGGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
l) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) FILTER - 15 MICRON
SERVO VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
BYPASS VALVE FILTER-100 MICRON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/!R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]- B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE ....
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTAMINATED
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: _!_ ......... _
BYPASS VALVE UNABLE TO RELIEVE SECONDARY HYDRAULIC P_sS_ FROM
QUAD CHANNELS; REMAINING SYSTEMS OVERDRIVES THE NON OPERATIONAL
SERVO CHANNEL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/24/86
ELEVON
114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONDARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: 3. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELEVON
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
SWITCHING VALVE
FILTER - 15 MICRON
SERVO VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
SECONARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: BROKEN OR BINDING SPRING; LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BYPASS VALVE OPENS REMOVING SERVO VALVE FROMLOOP. THREE
REMAINING SECONDARY SYSTEMS OVERDRIVE THE FAULTY CHANNEL.
ACTUATOR FUNCTION.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
FULL
REFERENCES:
C-15
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/24/86
ELEVON
115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER VALVE
RUPTURED HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) F_W CUTOFF VALVE
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
SWITCHING VALVE
FILTER - 15 MICRON
SERVO VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
POWER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC :
i/i
1/1
z/z
1/z
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL HYDRAULIC FLUID, SECONDARY PRESSURE, AND ASSOCIATED
PRIMARY ACTUATOR MOTION CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: POWER VALVE
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1_i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTAMINATED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL DOWNSTREAM MOTION; UNABLE TO CONTROL OR MOVE ELEVON.
REFERENCES:
===
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELEVON FLIGHT:
117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY ACTUATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RIccIo SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: I/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: I/1
ATO: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN SYSTEM, CRACKED HOUSING, GROSS LEAKAGE,
SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ELEVON MOTION AND CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELEVON FLIGHT:
118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LVDT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER 15 - MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: FRACTURE OF LVDT SUPPORT BASE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL OUTPUT AND POSITION FEEDBACK FROM PRIMARY ACTUATOR;
INABILITY TO DETERMINE ELEVON POSITION.
REFERENCES:
C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/ol/86
E_VON
119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIG_:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/i
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
PRIMLY AC_ATOR
STRUC_L FAIL_
_D _ALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) E_VON
2) F_W_TOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMLY AC_ATOR
9)
_ITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P__CH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: i/i ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
i/I
I/I
i/i
i/i
_DUND_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ]
_CATION: WING T_ILING EDGE
P_T_MBER: MC621-0014
B [NA ] C CNA ]
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
A_ATOR PISTON COMPONE_S (RODEND, TAI_TOCK, _TAINER, ETC.)
FAILS; _SS OF ET_VON CONTROL_D MOTION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/oi/86
ELEVON
120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY ACTUATOR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: DAMAGED SEALS-FOREIGN MATERIAL IN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BARRIER SEALS PREVENT LEAKAGE OF FLUID EXTERNAL TO COMPONENT;
SYSTEM OPERATES NORMALLY.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) E_VON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9) PRIMARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: BROKEN OR BINDING SPRING; LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __
LOSS OF PRIMARY CHANNEL, FULL FUNCTION ON THREE REMAINING
CHANNELS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: PRIMARY ACTUATOR DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OR NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: Jo RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9) PRIMARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: WING TRAILING EDGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0014
CAUSES: LOSS OF ASA CHANNEL OR POWER; OPEN LEAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THREE REMAINING SYSTEMS FEEDBACK ACTUATOR POSITION; SYSTEM
OPERATES NORMALLY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
" w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HEATER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER- 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9) HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATING ELEMENT CONTINUOUSLYPOWERED; AN OVER-TEMPERATURE HEATER
RESULTSI SYSTEM DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND EXCESS HEAT LOAD.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86
EI_VON
124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO VALVE
6) BYPASS VALVE
7) POWER VALVE
8) PRIMARY ACTUATOR
9) HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION OPENS LEAD TO UNIT; LOSS OF POWER TO HEATER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATING ELEMENT DOES NOT RECEIVE POWER; BACKUP HEATER CONDITIONS
ACTUATOR OR SYSTEM CAN BE EXCERCISED TO PREVENT UNDER TEMPERATURE
SITUATION.
REFERENCES:
C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
:to/o3/s6
ELEVON
125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SERVO ACTUATOR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. RICCIO SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELEVON
2) FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
3) SWITCHING VALVE
4) FILTER - 15 MICRON
5) SERVO ACTUATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WING TRAILING EDGE
MC621-0014
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/ZR
2/IR
2/ZR
C[P]
m
CAUSES: CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
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EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
SEAL FAILURE-ANY COMPONENT IN SERVO ACTUATOR SYSTEM; BARRIER SEAL
DESIGN ON ALL SEALS-SYSTEM OPERATES NORMALLY.
REFERENCES:
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
m
=_
MDAC ID
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
lll
i12
113
114
ll5
116
117
118
i19
124
125
ITEM FAILURE MODE
Switching valve
Switching valve
Switching valve
Check valve
Check valve
Filter - 15 miron
Servovalve
Servovalve restrictor
Bypass valve
Filter - i00 micron
Seal failure
Fails to switch
Component rupture
Fails closed
Fails open
Restricted flow
Jammed piston
Plugged
Fails to open/close
Plugged
Secondary delta P xducer Loss of output
Power valve
Power valve
Primary actuator
LVDT
Primary actuator
Heater
Servo actuator
Ruptured housing
Jammed
External leakage
Loss of output
Structural failure
Fails off
Internal leakage
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